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FOREWORD: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC REVISITED ONCE AGAIN 
MARK A. GRABER∗ 
Once upon a time, American lawyers knew the difference between pri-
vate and public.  Private law concerned relationships between individuals.  
Public law concerned the structure and powers of government institutions.  
Contracts was a private law subject.  The Contracts Clause of Article I, Sec-
tion 10 was a public law subject. 
Constitutional law policed the boundaries between the private and the 
public.  Government regulations had to have public purposes.1  Govern-
ments could regulate only business “affected with a public interest.”2  
Lochner v. New York3 and other cases implementing the freedom of con-
tract said to be protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments focuses on whether the law under constitutional attack 
was a legitimate exercise of the police power or an illegitimate attempt to 
support one party in a private bargain.4  The religion clauses protected pri-
vate belief but not public actions.5  The state action requirement of the 
Fourteenth Amendment entailed that Congress could prohibit public dis-
crimination, but not private discrimination.6  The New Deal and Great So-
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 1.  See Keith Whittington, Some Dilemmas in Drawing the Public/Private Distinction in 
New Deal Era State Constitutional Law, 75 MD. L. REV. 385 (2015). 
 2.  Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876). 
 3.  198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 4.  See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE & DEMISE OF 
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993). 
 5.  See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 6.  See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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ciety obliterated some public/private distinctions while erecting new ones.  
Government cannot search without a warrant in places where people have a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”7  The right of privacy protected by the 
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments encompasses 
rights to birth control, abortion and intimate behavior.8 
These and other public/public private distinctions are constantly being 
deconstructed and reconstructed.  New Dealers demonstrated that private 
law was really public law.  The freedom of contract made sense only in 
light of state-made property rules that authorized persons to acquire hold-
ings in certain ways, but not others, and to use those holdings in certain 
ways, but not others.9  Progressive and New Deal reformers insisted that the 
public was deeply interested in regulations that were formerly thought only 
to concern private interests.10  Nevertheless, rather than abandon privacy, 
privacy moved from economics to the First Amendment and lifestyle choic-
es.  Religion became the epitome of a private choice protected from gov-
ernment regulation,11 as did the right to decide whether to bear or beget a 
child,12 and the right to decide who to invite into one’s home.13 
The new private/public distinctions soon became antiquated and in 
need of further reconstruction.  In a welfare state in which government ben-
efits are pervasive, distinguishing private from public actors became in-
creasingly difficult, if not impossible.14  Feminists complained that the 
“personal was political.”15  Conservatives complained when the right to pri-
vacy was extended from claims that police ought not to be able to learn 
about what was happening in marital bedrooms to claims that same-sex 
couples had the right to marry, a very public action.16  New technologies 
                                                          
 7.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 8.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 9.  See Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 
(1943). 
 10.  See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934) (finding that “there is no closed class 
or category of businesses affected with a public interest”). 
 11.  See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (finding 
that private “religious activities which concern only members of the faith are and ought to be 
free”). 
 12.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53. 
 13.  See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“[I]t is the 
constitutional right of every person to close his home . . . on the basis of personal prejudice.”). 
 14.  See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: 
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (1996). 
 15.  See Kimberly D. Bailey, Lost in Translation: Domestic Violence, ‘The Personal Is Politi-
cal,’ and the Criminal Justice System, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1255 (2010). 
 16.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2620 (2015) (Roberts, CJ, dissenting) (stating that 
“the privacy cases provide no support for the majority’s position, because petitioners do not seek 
privacy”). 
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enabled the police to gain substantial information about residents without 
ever physically invading a place where persons had “a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.”  These developments spurred commentators and courts to 
reimagine what was public and what was private.  Privacy was slowly trans-
formed into autonomy.  David Gray and Danielle Citron imagined a right to 
quantitative privacy, which prohibited government in certain circumstances 
from keeping track of all the public actions of particular persons.17 
The Gray and Citron essay, The Right to Quantitative Privacy,18 high-
lights why the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law is 
a particularly appropriate site for a constitutional law schmooze devoted to 
the public and private.  For the last decade, Maryland Law has hosted an 
annual Schmooze where the leading thinkers in the fields of law, political 
science, history and philosophy discuss pressing issues of constitutionalism.  
During this time period, that law school has also been home to leading 
scholars whose work interrogates, deconstructs, and rebuilds distinctions 
between public and private.  Consider: 
• Danielle Keats Citron’s Hate Crimes in Cyberspace,19 which explores 
the extent to which the internet is a public space in which speech ought to 
be regulated to ensure civil discourse or a private space in which speech 
may be utterly uninhibited.20 
• Frank Pasquale’s The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That 
Control Money and Information,21 which discusses how which major cor-
porations aggregate public and semi-public information to manipulate con-
sumers and citizens. 
• Martha Ertman’s Love’s Promises: How Formal and Informal Con-
tracts Shape All Kinds of Families,22 which considers how the contractual 
agreements that structure relationships in the public world of work function 
to structure relationships in the private world of love. 
• Jana Singer’s Divorced from Reality: Rethinking Family Dispute Reso-
lution,23 which documents how divorce courts are moving from resolving 
                                                          
 17.  David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 
(2013). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014). 
 20.  See James Grimmelmann, The Illegal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Appli-
cation of Censorship, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 58 (2013) (discussing additional public and 
private means of regulating the Internet). 
 21.  FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT 
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015); see also Frank Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big 
Data: The Emerging Law of Health Information, 72 MD. L. REV. 682 (2013). 
 22.  MARTHA ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES: HOW FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONTRACTS 
SHAPE ALL KINDS OF FAMILIES (2015). 
 23.  JANA SINGER, DIVORCED FROM REALITY: RETHINKING FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
(2015). 
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private disputes between parties to reintegrating the broken family back into 
the more general society. 
• Richard Boldt and Jana Singer’s article, Juristocracy in the Trenches,24 
which details how courts are more generally moving from private dispute 
resolution to resolving public problems. 
The Papers in this Issue by Elvin Lim, John Compton, Carol 
Nackenoff, and Keith Whittington provide crucial background material by 
offering original insights into how Americans at different periods of time 
have understood the private and the public.  Lim sees the Framers of the 
Constitution of 1787/1791 as laying the constitutional foundations for pri-
vacy rights.25  Compton suggests we look to nineteenth-century evangeli-
cals for the notion of moral agency that is at the heart of contemporary pri-
vacy rights.26  Nackenoff explores the expansion of what constituted the 
“public” during the Progressive Era.27  Whittington demonstrates that the 
“private” was alive and well in state constitutionalism during the New 
Deal.28 
Brookes Brown and Maxwell Chibundu examine the theory of private 
and public.  Both papers explore the nature of “states” or “res publica,” the 
thing public.  Brown points out that the state action doctrine may be inco-
herent because the notion of the state entailed by that doctrine is incoher-
ent.29  Chibundu explores whether such public entitles as states may have 
dignity, a characteristic normally equated with private human beings.30 
Some participants in the symposium offer new reflections on 
longstanding problems of private and public.  Henry Chambers and James 
Oleske are concerned with how privacy impacts free exercise rights.  Both 
comment on the conceptual transformations that occur when free exercise 
rights once asserted by private individuals are asserted by private institu-
tions.  Chambers worries about how free exercise is reinterpreted when the 
private entity is a religious institution seeking exemptions for federal land 
                                                          
 24.  Richard Boldt & Jana Singer, Juristocracy in the Trenches: Problem-Solving Judges and 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Drug Treatment Courts and Unified Family Courts, 65 MD. L. REV. 
82 (2006). 
 25.  Elvin T. Lim, The Federalist Provenance of the Principle of Privacy, 75 MD. L. REV. 415 
(2015). 
 26.  John W. Compton, Evangelical Reform and the Paradoxical Origins of the Right to Pri-
vacy, 75 MD. L. REV. 362 (2015).  
 27.  Carol Nackenoff, Privacy, Police Power, and the Growth of Public Power in the Early 
Twentieth Century: A Not so Likely Coexistence, 75 MD. L. REV. 312 (2015). 
 28.  Whittington, supra note 1. 
 29.  Brookes Brown, A Conceptual Disaster Zone Indeed: The Incoherence of the State and 
the Need for State Action Doctrine(s), 75 MD. L. REV. 328 (2015). 
 30.  Maxwell O. Chibundu, Can, Do, and Should Legal Entities Have Dignity?: The Case of 
the State, 75 MD. L. REV. 194 (2015). 
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use and anti-discrimination laws.31  Oleske worries about how free exercise 
is reinterpreted when the private entity is a for-profit business claiming the 
right to be exempt from federal laws mandating they provide private em-
ployees with health insurance plans that include contraception.32  Several 
papers focus on privacy rights as they have played out in abortion and 
same-sex marriage.  Stuart Chinn explores the distinction between argu-
ments for abortion rights that focus on a more general, universal right to 
privacy, and arguments for abortion rights that focus on the particular as-
pects of privacy at issue in the abortion controversy.33  Ronald Kahn details 
how changes in public understandings of privacy rights help explain the 
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Due Process Clause as forbidding 
states to prohibit same-sex intimacy and same-sex marriage.34  Judith Baer 
examines how rights to privacy and equality have dovetailed and conflicted 
over the past half century.35 
Howard Schweber, Julie Novkov, Madison Kilbridge and Jason Iuli-
ano examine new issues raised by technological and conceptual develop-
ments in recent years.  Schweber points out how changes in the notion of 
the harms that can be considered public fuel both environmental move-
ments and movements to prohibit pregnant women from abusing alcohol 
and drugs.36  Kilbridge and Iuliano raise concern about the ways in which 
new technologies in neuroscience may interfere with mental privacy.37  
Novkov takes on a central issue perplexing campus administrators, how to 
balance public and private concerns, and well as equality interests, when 
preventing and punishing sexual assault on campus.38 
These and other contemporary efforts to figure out the boundary be-
tween the private and the public trench on the relationship between the pri-
vate and the public.  One the most common view, the public exists to pro-
tect the private.  Thomas Jefferson suggested this interpretation of the 
public/private relationship when he claimed that “all men . . . are endowed 
                                                          
 31.  Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Telescoping and Collectivizing Religious Free Exercise Rights, 
75 MD. L. REV. 392 (2015). 
 32.  James M. Oleske, Jr., Doric Columns Are Not Falling: Wedding Cakes, The Ministerial 
Exception, and the Public-Private Distinction, 75 MD. L. REV. 142 (2015). 
 33.  Stuart Chinn, University Arguments and Particular Arguments on Abortion Rights, 75 
MD. L. REV. 247 (2015). 
 34.  Ronald Kahn, The Right to Same-Sex Marriage: Formalism, Realism, and Social Change 
in Lawrence (2003), Windsor (2013), & Obergefell (2015), 75 MD. L. REV. 271 (2015). 
 35.  Judith A. Baer, Privacy at 50: The Bedroom, the Courtroom, and the Spaces in Between, 
75 MD. L. REV. 233 (2015). 
 36.  Howard Schweber, Legal Epistemologies, 75 MD. L. REV. 210 (2015). 
 37.  Madison Kilbridge & Jason Iuliano, Neuro Lie Detection and Mental Privacy, 75 MD. L. 
REV. 163 (2015). 
 38.  Julie Novkov, Equality, Process, and Campus Sexual Assault, 75 MD. L. REV. ___ 
(2016). 
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by their Creator with certain inalienable rights” and that “To secure these 
rights, governments are instituted among men.”39  We have the public 
sphere to ensure the existence of the more valuable private sphere.  Justice 
Anthony Kennedy took this Jeffersonian position in Obergefell v. Hodges 
when he claimed that a judicially enforceable Constitution was a means of 
ensuring that actions in the public sphere did not trench on the valuable in-
timacy and autonomy rights persons enjoyed in the private.40  The dissent-
ing opinions responded that the central purpose of the public is to define the 
private, a view best understood as challenging the majority’s understanding 
of which public processes best secured the more valuable private.41 
Justice Brandeis’s famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States sug-
gests and alternative relationship, that the private provides the foundation 
for a more robust public.  His assertion that “the right to be let alone” is 
“the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
men” 42 was rooted in the belief that the persons needed privacy to develop 
their “intellect . . . their beliefs (and) their thoughts.”43  Privacy was a fun-
damental condition for fulfilling public obligations as a citizen.  This com-
mitment to the private as a means for securing the public explains why Jus-
tice Brandeis informed the American Jewish community that “to be good 
Americans we must be better Jews”44 and why he insisted in Whitney v. 
California that “public discussion is a political duty.”45  Justice Brandeis, 
the first Jewish Supreme Court Justice, believed that people developed ca-
pacities in the private that enabled them to enrich both their public lives and 
the public lives of their community. 
The Brandeisian vision of the public interest in privacy has largely 
vanished from constitutional discourse.  Justice Kennedy spoke for most 
liberals in Lawrence v. Texas when he announced that the home is an en-
clave for intimate behavior that is of no interest to the public.46  What goes 
on in the home, stays in the home.  Those conservative justices and legal 
                                                          
 39.  Thomas Jefferson, The Declaration of Independence, in THE PORTABLE THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 235 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975). 
 40.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015) (noting that “[a]n individual can 
invoke a right to constitutional protection when he or she is harmed, even if the broader public 
disagrees and even if the legislature refuses to act”). 
 41.  See id. at 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“By deciding this question under the Constitu-
tion, the Court removes it from the realm of democratic decision.”). 
 42.  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Louis D. Brandeis, The Fruits of Zionism, in BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM: A COLLECTION OF 
ADDRESSES AND STATEMENTS BY LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 50 (Solomon Goldman ed., 1942). 
 45.  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 365 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 46.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Liberty protects the person from unwar-
ranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places.  In our tradition the State is 
not omnipresent in the home.”). 
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commentators who disagree rarely argue that politics is ennobling, only that 
some particular rights are not constitutionally protected.  When Justice 
Scalia declared that bans on certain forms of intimacy reflect public beliefs 
“that certain forms of sexual behavior are immoral and unacceptable,”47 he 
does not explore whether these beliefs are reasonable, are the consequences 
of considerable deliberation, or ought to be the concern of citizens engaging 
on politics in a world alternatively threatened by nuclear and climate disas-
ters.  One issue this Symposium puts on the table is whether a right to be let 
alone, that was once a precondition to better citizenship, threatens, in the 
modern world of hyper-liberalism, to become a right to escape citizenship. 
                                                          
 47.  Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
